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GLOBALIZATION A S A SIGNAL OF THE NEXT S T A G E IN
CULTURAL EVOLUTION
BY LEE STAUFFER
NEW MEXICO HIGHLANDS UNIVESITY

The development of human culture has not been a gradual, steadystate phenomenon. Rather, it is more like the punctuated equilibrium
that has been proposed for biological evolution. That is to say, long
periods of relatively little development have been periodically interrupted by complexes of change that produce emergently novel forms of
culture. An emergent phenomenon arises at a particular level of complexity; is completely unpredictable prior to its emergence; and leads to
a qualitative, as opposed to merely quantitative, difference.
The first such development predates the development of modern
humans. It is the appearance among Homo Erectus of the complex of
deliberately fashioned tools, the use of fire, and the tendency to wander
out of Africa. Before this, the creatures in our ancestral tree hardly
seem like "people." Afterward, they are clearly our relatives, albeit ones
we probably would not want to have come visiting. Then, almost a million years passes with little change.
Next, with the development of fully modern humans during the
Upper Paleolithic, about 40,000 years ago, a complex of change occurs
which we mostly observe in the archeological record. It shows itself primarily in aesthetic productions, but it undoubtedly involved many ideas
that have left no hard record and that some scholars think may have
involved the appearance of fully developed language. These people are
clearly like us. Again, not much happens for a while, and people continue in a hunting and gathering lifestyle while gradually covering the
entire planet.
Then, within the last 10,000 years, another emergent change takes
place, the so-called Neolithic revolution. While it is still ongoing in
some parts of the world, at any given location, once the change starts,
the revolution does occur in a revolutionarily short time.
I do not propose to get into the issue of why people started planting crops, whether it was a function of realizing a new possibility, or
was driven by scarcity and/or overpopulation. It is sufficient to observe
that people did start planting crops. At first it made little difference in
their lifestyle. Perhaps they dropped some seeds in the ground and left
those seeds to their fate while the tribe continued its hunting and gathering lifestyle. However, eventually, a second change occurred, and this
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led to an emergently different life. They started staying put and tending
the crops. At this point the other traits associated with the Neolithic
lifestyle followed in short order: permanent housing, pottery, villages,
and ground stone tools. This represented a new way of being human.
This has happened repeatedly and apparently independently all over the
world, in the Near East, the highlands of Mexico, Peru," and northern
and southern China. " Of course, it happened in many other places, but
those I have named are generally agreed to be independent inventions,
not borrowings from some other, previously Neolithic, culture.
These areas then underwent another emergent change - the development of cities. Again, I do not want to get into the issue of cause. It
seems clear, from the many areas which entered the neolithic level of
culture but did not independently become urbanized that being in the
Neolithic stage of culture does not cause a culture to become urbanized.
Indeed, as I have argued elsewhere," there appears to be a certain
amount of choice operating here. The Pawnee Indians, when presented with the horse, decided to give up a Neolithic lifestyle and return to
hunting and gathering. There is good evidence that both the Anasazi at
Chaco Canyon" and some groups of Maya deliberately decided that
urbanization involved sacrifices they were not willing to make. No
doubt, if we had the same sort of evidence for the old world that we
have for the new, we would find similar choices being made there.
There is nothing necessary about cultural evolution.
But, for whatever reason, the peoples in the areas I have named
moved into being civilized. There have been a number of lists of traits
that define civilization. Putting them all together the complete list that
I have developed is: (1) enlarged population, i.e., living in cities; (2) an
economy with a dominant central city and subservient peripheral villages; (3) specialization of labor and professionalism, especially of
trades associated with production; (4) a hierarchically structured social
system with at least three classes, elites, skilled workers and peasants;
(5) a social system based on residence rather than descent; (6) metallurgy; (7) the use of the wheel; (8) domesticated beasts of burden; (9)
trade in essential, as opposed to luxury, goods; (10) building of monumental structures; (11) writing; (12) mathematics; (13) astronomy and
calendars; (14) an agricultural surplus; (15) irrigation systems; and (16)
a hierarchal governmental system.
While this may not be a completely exhaustive list, it is certainly a
very long list of traits and it exhibits the problems which have dogged
all attempts to define civilization. That is, there is probably no single
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early civilization which exhibits all of these traits. Egypt did not initially develop a city-based system. Peru did not have writing.
Mesoamerica did not use the wheel and did not have beasts of burden.
Early China continued to base much of its social structure on descent
rather than residence. Further, those few traits that seem to be universal,
such as social stratification, are not sufficient to define civilization,
since cultures that we would not consider civilized exhibit them.
Consider, for example the Northwest Coast Native American groups,
which had a large, hierarchically structured society that we would nevertheless not consider to be civilized. Likewise, the Vinca culture of
Eastern Europe appears to have developed writing, but did not also
develop civilization.
The problems with this sort of check-list definition became apparent last year when this society attempted to determine which areas most
people would consider to be independent, civilized cultures. There was
very little agreement on such a list.
I would suggest that at least part of the problem comes from
attempting to define civilization in this way. Rather, I would like to suggest that civilization be defined by what I will call "functional characteristics" or what the philosopher John Dewey called "instruments,"
classes of problems and their solutions.
By analogy, I am suggesting we make the sort of shift that medicine makes when it moves from calling something a syndrome with a
mere list of symptoms which seem to happen together, to a disease
which is a description of the actual structure of the problem. I would
suggest that we will get much further in defining civilization if we consider what a trait does within a particular culture than we will by merely listing a group of traits that we think come together to form the social
system of civilization. Thus, I suggest that we consider how civilization
works.
(1) Complex and hierarchical social systems.
The first such function that I will propose is that of social complexity, since all civilizations appear to involve crowding a large number of people into a relatively small space. When you put a lot of people together in a small space, the likelihood of conflict increases, and
the egalitarian decision-making procedure which has worked for the village will no longer be adequate. Such decision-making procedures are
too cumbersome and take too long, so some way must be found to
choose a leader who can make quick decisions and whose orders will
then be obeyed. The source of the leader and his authority vary from
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culture to culture. In Sumer, the role of king appears to have developed
out of the war chief. Among the Maya the role of shaman was expanded. In China the leader was the clan elder. In each case, however, what
had been a "first among equals" becomes a king, often a god-king.
Human nature being what it is, the family of this leader generally
expected to benefit from his (and it generally was a "he") status and
indeed, the leader tended to want to pass his status on to be descendants.
Thus, the society develops a hereditary elite. Some scholars think that
Cahokia did not become civilized because the elite failed to become
hereditary.
Such an elite, however, can not run the society on its own, and so,
skilled specialists, whether scribes, warriors, or religious figures are coopted and come to see their welfare as being tied to the success of the
elite. At this point we have the hierarchically structured social system
listed above. As human complexity breeds complexity in an endless
feedback loop, the society becomes more and more complex and stratified.
Why numbers of people initially come to be crowded into a smaller space depends on the ecological situation of the particular culture. In
Mesopotamia and Egypt there was probably a gradual desiccation
which led to the need for systems of irrigation and thus a stronger government. In China, on the other hand, the problem was flooding and
possibly marauding barbarians. In Mesoamerica it appears that a shift
in the weather pattern led to an increase in microclimatization, making
areas suitable to agriculture less common and agriculture in general
more difficult. The specific ecological condition is not what's important,
but rather the fact of population density and the consequent need to deal
with it.
(2) A burst of technological innovation
Operating in tandem with complex and hierarchical social systems
is an exploitation of technological innovation. First, of course, more
people in contact with each other have more ideas. Then too, the original ecological crisis that produced the crowding requires solutions.
Among these solutions may be such things as irrigation systems in
Mesopotamia," raised beds in Mesoamerica, or dams and military
technology in China, to name just a few.
Also, the elite want ways to demonstrate their specialness. They
want to built monuments, dedicate bronze vessels to their ancestors or
to be buried with fine pottery and jade ornaments. All these require new
technologies. New technologies lead to a requirement for specialists,
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thus increasing the social complexity we considered above. Making a
cooking pot is fairly straightforward and can be done by the housewife
who will use it, but casting a Shang Bronze definitely requires a fulltime specialist. Likewise, while guessing at what the weather will be
like tomorrow can be done by anyone, developing a calendar and the
mathematics to understand it requires a specialist.
I would suggest that the particular technological advances are less
important than the rate of change. Wheels were of no real use the jungles of Mayaland but were vital on the plains of Sumer". Having the
concept of the zero was not needed to predict the relatively constant
weather in Egypt, but was apparently necessary in Mesoamerica.
Thus, arguing about whether a culture must have metallurgy or the
wheel or a calendar in order to be civilized overlooks the fact that different situations and different cultural worldviews lead to different technologies.
It is the fact and rate of change, rather than the specifics, that matter. In every culture that we would term "civilized," the relatively slow
rate of technological invention that characterizes the village environment changes so rapidly that things seem to happen "overnight." The
Egyptians go from the mastaba tomb to the Great Pyramid in about 100
years. Shang bronzes burst into the archaeological record so abruptly
that at one time western archaeologists claimed that the technology
must have been borrowed, although borrowed from whom was not
clear. Teotihuacan seems to have grown from a village into a great city
in a remarkable short period of time. The Mayan converted with
remarkable rapidity from agricultural villages... to... a monument
building, symbol using society.
(3) Trade: an economy homeostatic, yet not self-sufficient.
The third function of a civilization is somewhat harder to describe
in a few words than the previous two. This is, I suspect, because our
ideas of economics are so bound up in the notion of trade that we lack
good ways to examine the cultural concepts that underlie it.
I would suggest that civilization is characterized by a move away
from self-sufficiency and into a situation in which the needs of the
members of the society are satisfied by goods from a greater area. A village produces the vast majority of what it needs, both tangible and
intangible. It grows its own food, manufactures its own pots, and generates its own religious and social concepts and almost all the goods the
village produces, it uses itself. Those few goods and ideas that come
from elsewhere are usually not really necessary to the continued exis34
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tence of the village.
A city, on the other hand, is not self-sufficient. Its food comes from
the surrounding areas, which in turn depend on the city for manufactured goods. The city produces more than it needs of some goods in
order to exchange (whether by trade, warfare, or ritual exchange) for
other goods. This fact then presents the city with problems, those of
transport and finding some way of making the exchange work.
We are accustomed to think of transport in terms of beasts of burden and wheeled vehicles. However, in Mesoamerica, where no suitable
animals existed, the solution to the problem of how to transport goods
was solved by the building of roads, thus facilitating the passage of
human porters. Roads are as much as mark of civilization in the
Americas as the wheel is in the old world.
For an exchange of goods to occur, both parties must be convinced
to make the exchange. This may, of course, occur through trade.
However, this is by no means the only way for exchanges to occur. If
one party is stronger than the other, force can be used, and indeed, in the
ancient world, this was the origin of taxes. I suspect that up to and
including the time of Rome, the idea that citizens might choose whether
to be taxed would have impressed most people as nonsense. Rather, the
stronger force, the central city, forced the surrounding village to contribute to the economy of the city.
The villages may indeed have benefited in turn by receiving manufactured goods, weather predictions, religious rituals, etc., but I doubt
if most peasants would have seen it as a fair trade. The only true limit
on this sort of forced exchange would be the pragmatic one that if the
central city took too much from the peasants, the peasants would either
starve or leave. Thus, a city set up (probably unconsciously and by trial
and error) an exchange system that was homeostatic, and so could be
maintained over a period of time.
I suspect that many of the crises in civilization, such as the collapse
of the classical Maya and the late bronze age destruction in the Near
East, were at least in part failures to produce a system which was
homeostatic over a long period of time, an idea similar to Renfrew's
theory of collapse as a sign of internal weakness.
(4) Information processing
That last functional characteristic which I would propose for civilization is that of an increase in information processing. This is a term
that we have all become acquainted with without really considering
what it means. Information is the intangible data " that results from the
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firings of neurons in our brains, occupies the patterns of on and off circuits in computers, is turned into sound by a CD player and, as I have
proposed elsewhere, what Plato and Aristotle meant by Ideos, ideas or
forms. It exists only insofar as it is actualized by some material carrier,
such as brains, computers, CDs or pen and ink.
Information processing is then what we do with information. By
manipulating it, we get more information. We balance a checkbook and
find out how much money we have. We write a letter to let someone else
know what we know. We use a computer to predict the location of the
moon at some future date so we can send a rocket to the moon's future
position.
Information processing is also what we do when we think or speak.
Clearly one of the most significant advances in the history of humanity,
that symbolic ability developed in the Upper Paleolithic, was an example of an increase in information processing capacity.
The rise of civilization is another point at which such an increase
occurred. Keeping track of exchanges may lead to writing, as it did in
the Near East, but writing may also develop in order to engage in communication with the ancestors necessary for the benefit people on earth,
as it did in China, or it may have a ritual significance, as in did among
the Maya. Mathematics can serve to figure out who owes who how
much as in the Near East, but it may also be required to keep track of
the phases of Venus, as it did among the Maya.
The needs of society to process information may even be met by
techniques that we do not immediately think of, such as the abacus or
the Peruvian quipu, the knotted cords which both recorded data about
society and enabled the skilled user to make calculations about that
data.
To summarize, then, I would suggest that a civilization is a society
which has (1) a complex social structure (2) a large number of innovations in material culture (3) an economy which is both not self-sufficient
and homeostatic and (4) an increased information processing capacity.
I believe that all the traits in the list I began with can be subsumed under
one or more of the functional characteristics Furthermore, it must have
all of these. There are examples of cultures that have only some of these
functions but are not civilized, such as Cahokia and the Northwest
Coast tribes.
Various other advances in human society have also exhibited some
of the same functions. As I mentioned, the shift in the Upper Paleolithic
was primarily a change in information processing capacity. The change
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involving Homo Erectus was one based on technological innovation.
The Neolithic revolution resulted from a combination of technology and
increased social complexity.
This would suggest that when one or more of the functional characteristics exhibits a high rate of change, there is a fairly good probability that a culturally emergent evolutionary change is occurring. It
seems to me that since the beginning of the industrial revolution in
about 1600, we have been experiencing change in all four of the areas I
have considered.
The change in material culture is obvious. While it might be that an
inhabitant of ancient Uruk could understand most of what he saw in
classical Rome, the same understanding would not be true for a Roman
in New York City. The rate of technological change in material culture
in the past 400 years can only be termed stupendous.
Likewise, there has been a major increase in information processing capacity. First was the printing press, which made information
much more available. Then in the 20th century we have experienced a
whole new way of dealing with information as great as that brought
about by the invention of writing and mathematics. I do not just refer
here to computers, although that is, of course a large part of it, but also
the numerous ways of transferring information, beginning with the telegraph and proceeding through the telephone, radio, television and the
not to be sneezed at paperback book, which has probably decreased the
price of a book by almost as great a percentage as did the printing press.
There is also the still evolving World-Wide Web, the ultimate implications of which we cannot even imagine.
These two are fairly obvious. However, I would propose that we are
also experiencing change in the areas of social complexity and in economics. Seeing the structure of our own society is notoriously difficult,
but I would suggest that at least in the developed world, we have a different structure than either the egalitarian one of pre-civilized cultures
or the hierarchical one of early civilizations. The social system in the
latter was two-dimensional. There was only higher or lower. While
there might be innumerable shadings of degrees of status, it would have
been possible to rank order each member of society in terms of their
class status. Further, this was true even in the European Middle Ages.
This is not possible in contemporary society.
My own rank or status depends on the situation. In the academic
world, as a professor, I have a fairly high status. However, I do not make
a great deal of money, and so economically, my rank is fairly low. I may
54
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have a high status in one professional society that I have been involved
with for a long time and a low one in another which I have just joined
and my status will have nothing to do with the relative status of the two
societies. It seems to me that we have a social structure which can only
be represented by three (or maybe more) dimensions, by a network
rather than a line. Such ambiguity of status prior to the industrial revolution was, if not impossible, at least extremely uncommon and grounds
for considerable anxiety.
Last, we have experienced a qualitative change in our economic
interdependence. We have all heard of "globalism" until we are sick of
the term, but it describes a real phenomenon. While an early city did
depend on others for many of its needs, that dependence was definitely
limited by distance. Most food could be transported only over a fairly
limited area because it would not keep. Other raw material and manufactured goods might travel further, but the cost of transport would
swamp exchange value over too great a distance.
After all, it was not necessities but luxuries that traveled over the
Silk Road from China to the Mediterranean. Thus, while the city was
not self-sufficient, there was a larger area that was. In the modern,
developed world, no region can be said to be self-sufficient. We are, I
suspect, still working on getting our system of exchange homeostatic.
If all four of these functions are experiencing change, then it seems
plausible to me that we are living through another age of emergent evolution. Quite possibly there are other functions which are also changing
and which, since we are in the midst of it, we cannot see. I doubt if the
inhabitant of Uruk realized that they were inventing a new way of being
human, but they were. We, I suggest, are doing the same thing.
What this new way of being human will be like can probably be
known only in retrospect, but when we consider all the cultures, such as
the Anasazi of Chaco Canyon, that did not make it into being civilized
or the Maya civilization, which collapsed, it clearly behooves us to
work as hard as we possibly can to make this new level of human evolution work.
56
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